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Abstract 
In this paper we use a non-linear programming approach to predict the wider interregional and 
interindustry impacts of natural gas flow disruptions. In the short run, economic actors attempt to 
continue their business-as-usual and follow established trade patters as closely as possible. In the 
model this is modelled by minimizing the information gain between the original pattern of economic 
transactions and the situation in which natural gas flows are disrupted. We analyze four scenarios 
that simulate Russian export stops of natural gas by means of a model calibrated on an international 
input-output table with six sectors and six regions. 
The simulations show that at the lower levels of aggregation considerable effects are found. At the 
aggregate level of the whole economy, however, the impacts of the four scenarios are negligible for 
Europe and only a little less so for Russia itself. Interestingly, the effects on the size of the economy, 
as measured by its GDP, are predominantly positive for the various European regions, but negative 
for Russia. The effects on the welfare of the populations involved, however, as measured by the size 
of domestic final demand, have an opposite sign; with predominantly negligible but negative effects 
for European regions, and very small positive effects for the Russian population.  
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In aiming to ensure a resilient energy system, the European Union (EU) initiated an extensive energy 
policy package. Natural gas is given an important role in meeting future EU-wide energy demand. It 
can be flexibly produced and stored, and therefore represents a good backup for intermittent 
renewable energy. Significant natural gas demand growth and demand variability is foreseen, 
especially for certain regions (Smith, 2013). Due to dwindling EU natural gas reserves, dependency on 
non-EU gas flows will increase. Anticipating of these developments, multiple far-reaching measures 
have been taken in order to arrive at a single well-functioning internal gas market. The continuing 
integration of the gas market also contributes to larger gas flows across all EU countries. 
 Russia is one of the main suppliers of natural gas to the EU-market (International Energy Agency, 
2014). Over the years, problems between Russia and the Ukraine have had their impact on natural 
gas flows to the EU. The European Commission has published a reinforced energy security strategy, 
focusing on more resolute actions to diversify supply and strengthen the internal infrastructure in 
order to promote resilience to disruptions (European Commission, 2014a). This strategy is a response 
to the continuation of the important role of the Ukraine as transit country.  
  The recent problems in the Ukraine have increased the tension between the EU and Russia. 
Alternative routes, via Belarus or via the Baltic Sea do not offer enough spare capacity. To assess EU’s 
vulnerability to Russian gas supplies, the European Commission has undertaken a stress test to see 
whether the EU would be able to get through a winter without any imports from Russia. The sources 
expected to contribute most to the alternative supply of natural gas are Norway, LNG, and 
underground storage facilities in the EU. Only in case all Member States cooperate, no household 
would have to be affected. The Eastern Member States and former Yugoslavian countries would be 
affected most (European Commission, 2014b).  
 The strong international dimension of the gas market also implies that any supply shock will be 
propagated extensively through the network. Not only in terms of the physical flows of natural gas, 
but also in terms of the economic impact of gas flow disruptions. In this paper, we investigate the 
wider economic impacts of disruptions in the supply of natural gas with a new approach. A non-linear 
programming model is used to predict the short-run interregional and interindustry impacts of four 
disruption scenarios. These short-run impacts are determined by the attempts of economic actors to 
continue their business-as-usual and stay as close as possible to their established trade patterns. This 
behavioral response to a disruption is implemented by minimizing the difference between the pre- 
and the post-disruption pattern of economic transactions.  
 Several scenarios will be analyzed based on data from the EXIOPOL international input-output 
database (see Tukker et al., 2013), because this database includes a separate natural gas extraction 
sector. The set of scenarios we study focuses on the fact that Russia may decide to stop the export of 
natural gas. This can be a total ban on exports to the EU. Alternatively, it may be a setting in which 
only particular cross-border flows are hampered. For example, physical pipelines may be damaged, 
or Russia may decide to limit cross-border flows to certain European regions. These situations will be 
simulated by reducing or removing the flow of natural gas between countries. Limited changes in gas 
supply can be accommodated by the gas infrastructure of the EU, because of redundant capacity for 
security of supply reasons. However, due to limited transport capacity, or limited possibilities to 
extract additional gas, natural gas quantities that can be supplied in the short run will be limited. 
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 Our type of analysis of the economic impacts of natural gas flow disruptions will inform policy 
makers on critical gas supplier relations and critical cross-border pipeline connections. It may also 
provide information regarding strains on the rest of the system following a gas supply disruption. 
This type of approach can also be used to further investigate mitigation strategies, for example, 
diversifying supply or investing in additional infrastructure. 
 
2. Modeling methodology, data and scenarios 
The model used mimics that, in the short run, economic actors attempt to continue their business-as-
usual, and attempt to follow established trade patters as closely as possible. This behavior is 
simulated by minimizing the information gain between the original pattern of economic transactions, 
as shown in the base year interregional input-output table (IRIOT) at hand, and the situation in which 
the flow of natural gas is disrupted, as captured by the measure originally proposed by Kullback 
(1959) and Theil (1967). Here, we use a slightly adapted version of the information measure that is 
referred to as IGRAS (Huang et al., 2008). Our type of model was first set-up to analyze the impact of 
natural disasters (Oosterhaven et al., 2013), but it is also suited to simulated the impacts of trade 
boycotts. See Oosterhaven (2015) for the reasons of choosing this modelling approach above, e.g., 
the input-output inoperability model or the hypothetical extraction method. 
2.1. Base model 
The objective function of the model minimizes the information loss of the disrupted IRIOT compared 
to the base year IRIOT: 
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, , , , ,
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where the represented variables are: z = intermediate demand, y = final demand, excluding changes 
in inventories and valuables, and v =  value added at market prices (GDP). The four indices are i,j = 1, 
…, I, with I = number of industries, and r,s = 1, …, R, with R = number of regions, where · represents 
the sum over an index, and where ex = exogenous, i.e. the actual values from the base year IRIOT. 
Note that the base year values just in front of the square brackets do not influence the minimization 
of (1). They are only added to ensure that the base year value of (1) equals zero. 
 We assume cost minimization under a Walras-Leontief production function, per input, per 
industry, per region, which results in (Oosterhaven, 1996): 
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where x = total output, a = intermediate inputs per unit of output, and c = value added per unit of 
output, where a and c are calculated from the base year IRIOT as 
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 We assume that markets are in short run equilibrium, i.e., that demand equals supply, per 
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Note that (2) and (3) combined ascertain that total input equals total output, per industry, per 
region, which implies that any solution of (1)-(3) satisfies the IRIOT accounting identities. 
 In the specific case studied here, i.e., that of natural resource extraction, the production of 
additional output is restricted by existing reserves. Our last restriction, therefore, specifies our 
estimate of the natural gas production restrictions by region. 
 
 ,max , ,
r r
i ix x i r≤ ∀ . (4) 
 
The above non-linear programming approach (1)-(4), thus combines the assumption of fixed 
technical coefficients with flexible trade coefficients. This implies that (partial) import and export 
substitution (cf. Oosterhaven, 1988) is considered to be a realistic solution to supply shocks to the 
flows of natural gas. 
2.2. Data 
The input-output database used has been constructed during the EXIOPOL project (Tukker et al., 
2013).
1
 The full database contains 43 countries and 129 sectors. For this first empirical application of 
this new model, we have aggregated the data to six sectors and six regions. The sectors and regions 
represented are given in Table 1. In Appendix A the concordances with the original data are given. 
The different categories of value added per sector have been combined with the data on taxes less 
subsidies per sector, resulting in one value that represents each sector’s contribution to GDP. In the 
remainder of this paper, we refer to this single value simply as “value added”. 
 
Table 1: Regions and sectors represented in the model 
Regions   Sectors 
North-West Europe  Primary  
South-West Europe  Natural gas extraction 
East Europe  Other energy extraction 
North-East Europe  Secondary  
Russian Federation  Electricity from gas 
Rest of the World  Tertiary  
 
 The focus of our study is on the European Union. Its countries have been divided into four regions 
primarily based on their geographical location and the layout of the main gas pipelines, and 
secondarily based on their position in the gas market. Of all non-EU countries, we have kept the 
Russian Federation as a separate region, due to its important role in the supply of gas on the 
                                                          
1
 The data are publicly available via the website exiobase.eu. For this study EXIOBASE 1 (year 2000) was used, 
as the follow-up IRIOT was not available at the time this analysis was undertaken. 
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European market. All countries outside the European Union and Russia have been combined into one 
large region called ‘Rest of the World’. The grouping of countries is visually represented in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Grouping of EU countries into regions 
 
 
 With respect to the sectors, we have kept two single sectors from the extensive set of sectors 
represented in the full EXIOPOL database. These are the natural gas extraction sector and that part of 
the electricity sector that is fuelled by natural gas. The natural gas extraction sector will allow us to 
look at the specific effects of changes in the supply of natural gas. The electricity from gas sector is 
fully dependent on the supply of natural gas and is directly harmed by a reduction in the supply of 
natural gas. The third small sector, other energy extraction, is an aggregation of all other individual 
energy extraction sectors that are present in the EXIOPOL database. This sector may function as a 
substitute for natural gas extraction in an indirect sense. Given the Leontief technology assumption 
in Equation (2), natural gas inputs cannot be directly substituted. However, sectors in different 
countries may rely on different energy sources. Consequently, the output of such a sector may be 
substituted for the output of a sector that relies on natural gas, which represents an indirect type of 
substitution. The remaining sectors are aggregated into a primary sector representing agriculture, 
forestry and fishing, a secondary sector representing manufacturing, and a tertiary sector 
representing services. 
 Europe’s capacity to produce additional natural gas domestically is severely limited due to limited 
reserves. To include this in the model, all scenarios are implemented with constraints on additional 
production. The percentages for North-West Europe and for the Rest of the World have been derived 
from European Commission (2014b). The percentages for the other regions are set in relation to their 
current production capacity and represent general estimates of what could additionally be produced 




Table 2: Natural gas production capacity constraints 
Region Additional production cap 
North-West Europe 15% 
South-West Europe 10% 
East Europe 10% 
North-East Europe 0% 
Russia 50% 
Rest of the World 100% 
 
2.3. Scenarios 
To study the economic impacts of disruptions in the flows of natural gas, we have defined four 
scenarios. All scenarios focus on Russia due to its role as single most important supplier of natural 
gas to the EU economy. In the first scenario Russian exports to all European countries are stopped, in 
the second only its exports to North-East Europe, in the third only its exports to East Europa, and in 
the fourth only its exports to North-West and South-West Europe. The first scenario is thus a 
combination of the latter three. The different scenarios are shown in Table 3. A list of the specific 
countries belonging to the different regions can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Table 3: Natural gas disruption scenarios 
Scenario Region imposing export ban: On its natural gas exports to: 
1 Russian Federation All four EU regions 
2 Russian Federation - North-East Europe  
3 Russian Federation - East Europe  
4 Russian Federation - South-West Europe and North-West Europe 
 
 Although natural gas exports are not as important for the Russian economy as oil exports, fully 
cutting off the European market, as in Scenario 1, will not go unnoticed in terms of economic activity. 
To reduce its dependency on Europe as a buyer, Russia is diversifying its customers´ portfolio by 
working towards opening up Asian markets for Russian gas exports (Dickel et al, 2014). However, 
negotiations with China have been slow and cumbersome (Henderson and Stern, 2014). Even though 
the recently agreed contract with China includes building a pipeline, it is not expected to be 
operational before 2020 (International Energy Agency, 2014). In addition, this pipeline will not even 
compete directly with exports to Europe, because the networks are not connected. Construction of a 
pipeline that would allow Russia to alternate gas flows between Europe and China is only a sketchy 
plan (Dickel et al, 2014). Therefore, especially, Scenario 1 represents an extreme variant, only meant 




3.1. Base scenario with natural gas dependencies 
First, the base scenario, with which the natural gas disruption scenarios need to be compared, is set 
up. For this scenario we exclude the discrepancy column present in the IRIOT (Tukker et al., 2013) 
and we also exclude all changes in inventories and valuables. Both types of data do not represent 
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actual economic transactions for which we assume that economic actors will try to maintain them as 
much as possible. The removal of these data results in an IRIOT in which supply does not equal 
demand. In the base scenario, this equilibrium is restored using the base model, i.e., Equations (1)-
(3). The specific functional form of the objective function can be used in this case, as all negatives are 
removed from the data. 
 To evaluate the resulting change in the IRIOT, the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and 
the weighted mean absolute percentage error (WAPE) are used.
2
 The MAPE is found to be 387% and 
the WAPE is equal to only 0.11%, which indicates that large percentage changes predominantly occur 
in the smallest cells of the IRIOT. The size of the world economy, as measured by world GDP, which 
relates to the largest cells, was equal to 34,009 billion Euros in the original IRIOT, whereas in the base 
scenario IRIOT the total is 34,002 billion euros (99.98% of the original total). Hence, we conclude that 
the base scenario IRIOT is sufficiently close to the original IRIOT to serve as the starting equilibrium 
for the scenario simulations. 
 Using the outcomes of the base scenario IRIOT, new coefficient matrices for • and  are 
calculated, which are used for the disruption scenarios. Also, all values with ex in Equation (1) are 
replaced with the corresponding values of bm, where bm indicates the base scenario values. In 
addition, the initial market equilibrium, from which the optimization procedure starts, is updated to 
the outcome of the base scenario. For each scenario this procedural starting IRIOT is adjusted such 
that the cells directly affected by the scenario are already set equal to zero, in order to speed up the 
convergence of the non-linear programming algorithm. 
 To better interpret the results of the disruption scenarios, Table 4 summarizes the role of the 
Russian natural gas in the base scenario. The first two columns show the importance of the various 
buyers from a Russian perspective. They show that especially South-West Europe and East Europe 
are important buyers of the Russian gas, while most natural gas flows to the secondary sector and 
the electricity from gas sector. For North-East Europe, these two sectors also demand most of the 
gas supplied by Russia. The last two columns of the table show the importance of the Russian gas 
supplies from the perspective of the buying sectors and regions. This shows that North-West Europe 
is hardly dependent on imports of Russian gas, due to its availability of large quantities of local 
natural gas, whereas East Europe is very dependent on Russian natural gas.  
 
                                                          
2




  , and WAPE =
∑ ||
∑ 
∗ 100%, where !"  represents the original IRIOT 
values, and #$  represents the base model IRIOT values (i.e. %&, (&  and )&). 
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Table 4: Russia’s natural gas sector’s role as supplier 
Region Sector 
Sales of 
Russian gas to 
a specific 
region-sector 
in million € 
Sales to a 
region-sector 
as % of total 
output of the 
Russian gas† 
Russian sales 
as % of total 
gas inputs per 
region-sector 
Russian sales 




North-West Primary 0.1 0% 0% 8% 
   Europe Natural gas extract. 0.1 0% 0% 2% 
 Other energy extr. 0.2 0% 0% 1% 
 Secondary 1.4 0% 0% 2% 
 Electricity from gas 0.3 0% 0% 2% 
 Tertiary 0.2 0% 0% 1% 
 Final demand 0.4 0% 0% 2% 
South-West Primary 1.8 0% 4% 4% 
   Europe Natural gas extract. 0.4 0% 2% 5% 
 Other energy extr. 0.9 0% 2% 5% 
 Secondary 277.7 6% 4% 4% 
 Electricity from gas 477.7 11% 7% 8% 
 Tertiary 21.1 0% 2% 4% 
 Final demand 73.2 2% 2% 4% 
East Primary 2.1 0% 35% 41% 
   Europe Natural gas extract. 10.4 0% 18% 92% 
 Other energy extr. 2.8 0% 12% 67% 
 Secondary 514.9 12% 31% 41% 
 Electricity from gas 411.3 9% 35% 50% 
 Tertiary 278.4 6% 73% 87% 
 Final demand 5.4 0% 12% 21% 
North-East Primary 0.5 0% 11% 11% 
   Europe Natural gas extract. 0.0 0% 18% 20% 
 Other energy extr. 0.0 0% 19% 19% 
 Secondary 44.5 1% 18% 18% 
 Electricity from gas 79.7 2% 81% 81% 
 Tertiary 1.0 0% 6% 6% 
 Final demand 4.1 0% 13% 13% 
† In total 48% of Russian natural gas flows to EU regions. 
 
3.2. Trade adjustments in the four scenarios 
Given the Leontief technology restriction (2), substitution between products of different sectors is 
ruled out. However, local products may be substituted for products of the same sector from a 
different country. We therefore, first, focus on the shift in trade shares in each gas export ban 
scenario. 
3.2.1. Import patterns for each of the regions under all scenarios 
To assess the impact on trade patterns, we study the import and self-sufficiency shares (in short: 
import shares) for each region-sector combination for the base model and for each scenario. These 
shares are defined relative to the total use of the product at hand as shown in the Equation (5). This 
allows us to focus on the geographical origin of the inputs from the natural gas sector.  
 *+,-. =  /+,-. ∑ /+,-.-0  ,        *1+-. =  1+-. ∑ 1+-.-⁄  (5) 
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 Table 5 shows these intermediate demand and final demand import shares under the various 
scenarios. The supply of natural gas from North-East Europe is not shown, as it equals zero in all 
cases.  
 
Table 5: Intermediate and final demand import shares of natural gas for each affected region* 
5-A Intermediate demand import shares Final demand import shares 
North-West Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 
North-West Europe 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.4 99.2 99.1 99.2 99.1 99.2 
South-West Europe  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
East Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Russia 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 - 
Rest of the World 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 
 
5-B Intermediate  demand import shares Final demand import shares 
South-West Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 
North-West Europe 44.0 45.1 43.8 42.9 46.0 57.4 58.0 57.3 57.0 58.2 
South-West Europe  13.2 14.1 13.3 13.2 13.8 39.2 40.9 39.2 38.9 40.6 
East Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Russia 5.1 - 5.2 6.4 - 2.4 - 2.5 3.1 - 
Rest of the World 37.7 40.8 37.7 37.5 40.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 
 
5-C Intermediate  demand import shares Final demand import shares 
East Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 
North-West Europe 22.6 39.8 22.4 39.8 21.5 12.2 16.5 12.1 17.4 11.8 
South-West Europe  5.7 10.6 5.7 10.7 5.3 10.9 16.2 10.9 15.4 10.5 
East Europe 27.3 31.7 27.1 31.7 26.1 41.0 32.2 41.1 32.7 41.2 
Russia 36.6 - 37.0 - 39.9 12.1 - 12.4 - 13.4 
Rest of the World 7.9 17.9 7.8 17.7 7.2 23.8 35.0 23.6 34.4 23.2 
 
5-D Intermediate  demand import shares Final demand import shares 
North-East Europe B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 B. Sc. Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 
North-West Europe 54.0 81.6 82.0 50.8 51.8 71.4 80.4 81.7 68.7 69.4 
South-West Europe  1.6 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.5 7.9 9.6 9.0 7.7 7.8 
East Europe 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Russia 34.7 - - 38.3 37.5 12.6 - - 15.8 14.9 
Rest of the World 9.7 16.2 15.9 9.4 9.1 7.9 9.8 9.0 7.7 7.7 
* In scenarios indicated by a black border, the region is directly impacted (zero imports from Russia). 
 
 For North-West (NW) Europe and South-West (SW) Europe Table 5-A and Table 5-B, respectively, 
show that the trade patterns for these regions do not change much even if they are fully cut off from 
Russian gas. In Table 5-B, we see that SW Europe relies most on NW Europe and Rest of the World 
for its intermediate gas supplies. The final demand import shares react notably different from the 
intermediate demand import shares; most natural gas is sourced close to home, in NW and SW 
Europe itself. Scenario 4 shows that, if possible given the production restrictions, preference is given 
to NW European gas over additional own production and supplies from the Rest of the World. The 
share imported from NW Europe is higher in scenario 4, than in Scenario 1, where also East Europe 
and NE Europe demand additional gas from NW Europe. 
 For East Europe, Table 5-C shows that the reliance on Rest of the World increases relatively most, 
followed by SW Europe and only then NW Europe. Still, instead of Russia, NW Europe is the largest 
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supplier for the scenarios under which East Europe is directly affected. For the scenarios where the 
region is not directly affected, the supply share of NW Europe actually decreases somewhat.  
 North-East Europe in Table 5-D is a special case. Four of the five countries of this region (the Baltic 
States and Finland) are almost fully dependent on Russia for their gas supplies, whereas Sweden fully 
relies on gas supplies from NW Europe. Since the natural gas demand in Sweden is relatively high 
compared to the other four countries, the intermediate and final demand import shares as regards 
NW Europe are relatively high for this heterogeneous region. The possibility of additional supply 
from NW Europe will, in the current situation, therefore will actually be lower than shown in Table 5-
D.  
 For the last three scenarios, in the Tables 5-B to 5-D, we see that if a region is not directly affected 
by the export ban, it will actually import a somewhat larger share of natural gas from Russia, as 
Russia will look for alternative buyers. Our model thus simulates reality in that it does not allow for 
an extreme switch to Russian gas because of the assumption that under each disruption all economic 
actors will attempt to maintain as closely as possible to their business-as-usual flows. 
3.2.2. Change in the supply of natural gas sectors in the different regions 
Table 5 considered the spatial origin of the trade in natural gas in the different scenario´s. Table 6 
instead focusses on the change in supply of natural gas and its spatial destination. The latter table 
reports these changes as a percentage of the base scenario´s total supply of natural gas by producing 
country.  
 In Scenario 1, the fall in supply from Russia is clearly largest for SW Europe (–19.31%) and East 
Europe (–27.75%). Russia itself absorbs some of this fall in exports domestically, as does the Rest of 
the World to a greater extend (+6.34%). However, the total output of the Russian natural gas 
extraction sector will still fall with as much as -41.42%, which will definitely hurt the Russian 
economy as we will be shown in Table 8.  
 The most notable increase in supply (+11.52%) is the additional percentage that East Europe 
supplies to itself for both scenarios that affect the region directly. With this increase, East Europe is 
the only region that hits the maximum production capacity that we defined exogenously in Table 2. 
In contrast, in the two scenarios where East Europe is not directly hit, the supply of its own natural 
gas sector falls, as Russia will then sell more to East Europe.  
 Also remarkable are the changes in the supply of NW Europe, not because they are large, but 
because they are small. This is the more remarkable because we know from Table 5 that all regions 
import more from NW Europe when they are affected, especially East Europe and North-East Europe. 
The explanation is that the domestic use of natural gas in North-West Europe is large compared to 
the demand from the other regions, which makes the percentage point changes in its exports small.  
 Comparing the sum of the different scenarios in which a subset of the regions is affected 
(Scenarios 2-4) with Scenario 1, the sum of the ‘individual’ scenarios generally turns out to be smaller 
than the changes in supply in Scenario 1. When the shock is smaller, there is obviously more 




Table 6: Change in sales of the natural gas sector by region of origin, as a percentage of total output 
 Regions of destination of natural gas sales Total  
change Scenario 1: all EU  NW  SW East NE* Russia RoW 
North-West Europe -0.55 0.10 1.46 0.25 0.00 -0.10 1.16 
South-West Europe 0.08 2.08 3.74 0.04 0.00 -0.56 5.38 
East Europe -0.05 -0.21 11.52 -0.01 -0.02 -1.23 10.00 
Russia -0.06 -19.31 -27.75 -2.94 2.31 6.34 -41.42 
Rest of the World 0.00 0.31 0.21 0.01 -0.11 -0.30 0.12 
Scenario 2: NE Europe NW SW East NE* Russia RoW  
North-West Europe -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 0.25 0.00 -0.01 0.06 
South-West Europe 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.07 
East Europe 0.00 0.00 -0.52 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.49 
Russia 0.00 0.50 0.36 -2.94 0.13 0.24 -1.70 
Rest of the World 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Scenario 3: East Europe NW SW East NE* Russia RoW  
North-West Europe -0.33 -0.66 1.45 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.41 
South-West Europe 0.02 -1.48 3.78 -0.01 0.00 0.07 2.39 
East Europe -0.04 -0.20 11.52 -0.02 -0.02 -1.24 10.00 
Russia 0.02 4.90 -27.75 0.32 1.00 2.56 -18.94 
Rest of the World 0.00 -0.02 0.21 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 0.03 
Scenario 4: SW+NW NW SW East NE* Russia RoW  
North-West Europe -0.22 0.63 -0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.28 
South-West Europe 0.00 1.77 -0.29 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.66 
East Europe 0.01 0.03 -3.56 0.00 0.00 0.17 -3.35 
Russia -0.06 -19.31 2.64 0.25 0.71 1.80 -13.98 
Rest of the World 0.00 0.25 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.13 0.06 
Note: the changes within the marked and darker shaded boxes represent the values that are set to zero. 
In all cases where the 2-digit value is equal to 0.00, a minus sign is included if the (small) change is negative. 
* North-East Europe is not included as a row in the different scenarios due to the non-existing gas extraction. 
 
 
3.2.3. Impacts on the trade balances 
The previous sections investigated the changes in trade shares for the natural gas sector only. To 
place these changes in perspective, the changes in the trade balance for each region are presented 
here. The balance for each region is calculated as follows. 
 
 3. =  ∑ /+,.--4.,+,, + ∑ 7+.- − ∑ /+,-.-4.,+,, − ∑ 7+-.-4.,+-4.,+   (6) 
 
 In Table 7, the first column shows the balance for each region in the base scenario in absolute 
values. The total of this column equals zero, because total exports equal total imports at the world 
level. For Russia, the export ban to all of Europe (Scenario 1) has a relatively large negative impact on 
the value of its trade balance, which is now less positive than in the base scenario. The trade surplus 
of NW Europe and SW Europe increases in all scenarios. Most remarkable, however, is the relatively 
small size of the impacts on the trade balances of all scenario´s. This raises the question whether the 




Table 7: Balance of payments, percentage change compared to base scenario 
 B. Sc. (M €) Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 
North-West Europe 74,110 0.74% 0.05% 0.32% 0.22% 
South-West Europe 27,469 1.65% 0.05% 0.69% 0.84% 
East Europe -32,866 -0.41% 0.03% -0.49% 0.17% 
North East Europe 26,185 -0.03% 0.06% -0.06% -0.05% 
Russia 45,194 -3.12% -0.13% -1.41% -1.05% 
Rest of the World -140,092 -0.20% 0.00% -0.05% -0.11% 
  
3.3. Impact on value added  
The changes in trade patterns in Table 5 and Table 6 influence value added generated in each region-
sector. Table 8 shows the change in value added for the three smaller sectors for each region 
separately. The three large sectors (primary, secondary and tertiary) are only represented indirectly 
by the total change of GDP, because the changes in terms of inputs from the natural gas sectors, and 
other shifts in the input structure, are relatively small compared to the overall size of these sectors.  
 Alike the changes in trade shares, we see again that the overall change in value added for 
Scenario 1 is larger than the sum of the changes in the three sub-scenarios. Clearly, in the case of 
complete Russian gas export ban to the entire EU, fallback systems, where other regions step in for 
the loss of Russian supply, are also hit, including the feedback loops between these systems, 
resulting in a larger impact than with the sum of parts.  
 At the level of the three small sectors, the behavior of the gas extraction sector, on the one hand, 
and the other energy extraction and the electricity from gas sectors, on the other hand, is opposite in 
almost all cases. The equal signs of the changes for both the other energy extraction sector and the 
electricity sector indicate that the theoretical possibility of indirect technical substitution does occur 
in our model simulations. The aggregate character of the other three sectors, obviously, prevents this 
indirect substitution to dominate the direct technical complementary assumed in Equation (2). 
 The opposite sign of the changes in, especially, the electricity from gas sector and the gas 
extraction sector requires a longer explanation. The increases in local gas extraction in the EU 
regions, in fact, occur to compensate for the drop in Russian imports, but this compensation appears 
to be partial, and, therefore, it is combined with an opposite change in the use of gas by the 
electricity from gas sector. The case of East Europe is especially interesting in both cases where it is 
not itself subject to a Russian export ban, i.e., in the Scenario´s 2 and 4. In those cases, Russia will 
increase its exports to East Europe, its largest customer in the EU, in order to compensate for its 
losses in the rest of the EU. Consequently, we see an increase in the output of the electricity from gas 
sector in East Europe combined with a decrease in its home extraction of natural gas. 
 Furthermore, in all scenarios, we see that the change in the local natural gas extraction sector 
determines the sign of the change in total GDP for almost all regions. Higher order spatial 
substitution processes mitigate the direct impact on the natural gas extraction sector, but do not 
change the sign of its impact on total value added. The exception is North-East Europe that does not 
have a natural gas extraction sector. In that case, we see that the change in the secondarily impacted 
sector, i.e., the electricity from gas sector, determines the sign of the total GDP impact.  
 As to the size of the total GDP impact, the only region that really suffers from the export bans is 
Russia itself, but even that impact is almost negligible at the level of the aggregate economy, i.e., – 
0.5% in case of the maximum supply shock of Scenario 1. NW and SW Europe profit from all four 
13 
 
types of export bans, but their gains are both absolutely and percentagewise much smaller that the 
already small losses for Russia.  
 
Table 8: Percentage change in value added in the gas-related sectors and the total economy 
Scenario 1: all EU NW SW E NE Russia RoW 
Natural gas extraction 1.16 5.38 10.00 - -41.42 0.12 
Other energy extraction -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.00 
Electricity from gas -0.28 -0.47 -7.50 -8.48 1.74 -0.05 
Total value added 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.50 0.00 
Total absolute change* 320 150 18 -9 -1280 105 
       
Scenario 2: NE NW SW E NE Russia RoW 
Natural gas extraction 0.06 0.07 -0.49 - -1.70 0.00 
Other energy extraction -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 0.00 -0.00 
Electricity from gas 0.01 -0.00 0.19 -8.18 0.25 -0.00 
Total value added 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 
Total absolute change* 16 2 -2 -7 -52 1 
       
Scenario 3: E NW SW E NE Russia RoW 
Natural gas extraction 0.41 2.39 10.00 - -18.94 0.03 
Other energy extraction -0.01 0.00 -0.06 0.04 0.01 -0.00 
Electricity from gas -0.13 0.09 -7.98 0.52 0.46 -0.01 
Total value added 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.23 0.00 
Total absolute change* 113 80 20 0 -588 28 
       
Scenario 4: SW+NW NW SW E NE Russia RoW 
Natural gas extraction 0.28 1.66 -3.35 - -13.98 0.06 
Other energy extraction -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
Electricity from gas -0.09 -0.35 1.25 0.38 0.26 -0.03 
Total value added 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.17 0.00 
Total absolute change* 77 37 -14 0 -435 47 
* in absolute M€ compared to base model 
 
3.4. Impact on total domestic consumption 
As a second measure of welfare, next to value added, and in fact even more relevant for domestic 
welfare, we also look at the impact of the four scenario´s on domestic final demand.  
 The changes in the underlying final demand import and self-sufficiency shares of the directly 
impacted gas extraction sector were shown in Table 5. The associated impact on the volume of the 
final consumption of natural gas, irrespective of its geographic origin, is shown in Table 9. Again note 
that the sum of the Scenario´s 2 to 4 is smaller than the impact of the combined Scenario 1. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that the domestic consumption of the more abundant natural gas in Russia 
will increase in all scenarios, whereas the natural gas consumption of the European regions 
decreases in almost all cases.  
 Interesting are the two plusses. Take the +2.6% of the consumption of natural gas in East Europe 
in case of a supply shock in SW and NW Europe (Scenario 4). East Europe being near, obviously, 
serves as a substitute market for Russian gas in that case. The same holds for the +0.2% increase in 
North -East Europe, in case of a supply shock in East Europe (Scenario 3). The most puzzling outcome 
of Table 10 seems to be the decrease in the consumption of natural gas in the RoW. However, this 
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can also be explained easily. The strong increase in the exports of natural gas from the RoW to the 
boycotted regions of Europe partly goes at the cost of their local consumers. 
 
Table 9: Change in the final consumption of natural gas, in percentages 
 B. Sc. (abs. M€)  Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 
North-West Europe 2,533  -8.2 -0.8 -4.7 -3.4 
South-West Europe 3,075  -7.7 -0.6 -4.0 -4.8 
East Europe 44  -32.5 -0.1 -32.2 2.6 
North-East Europe 32  -16.7 -13.1 0.2 -1.0 
Russian Federation 21  46.2 1.2 15.3 9.3 
Rest of the World 26,674  -0.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 
 
 Finally, consider Table 10 that shows the impacts of the four scenarios on the welfare of the 
population of the regions involved. Remarkably, in contrast with the negative impact on GDP, the 
Russian population will benefit from the Russian refusal to export its natural gas to parts or the 
whole of the EU. Part of the reason for this outcome is the increase of the domestic consumption of 
natural gas shown in Table 9. The other part of the reason is summarized in Table 7, which shows a 
decrease of its trade balance surplus, which enables Russian consumers to consume more of the 
negatively impacted domestic value added. Whether this change is sustainable in the longer run may 
be doubtful, but in the short run, which is the focus of our model, this impact is quite likely.  
 The reverse impact may be observed for most European regions with most scenario´s. There, 
increases in total value added, concentrated in the local gas extraction sector, go together with 
decrease of total domestic consumption. Again, part of the reason is found in the lower consumption 
of natural gas shown in Table 9, and another part of the reason is found in the more positive trade 
balances in Table 7. 
 





Sc. 1 Sc. 2 Sc. 3 Sc. 4 
North-West Europe 2,166  -0.011 -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 
South-West Europe 5,524  -0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.004 
East Europe 717  -0.016 0.001 -0.020 0.006 
North-East Europe 355  0.000 -0.006 0.005 0.004 
Russian Federation 212  0.062 0.002 0.024 0.018 
Rest of the World 25,027  -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
4. Conclusion and evaluation 
In this paper we have analyzed several scenarios pertaining to reductions or obstructions in the 
supply of natural gas across country borders. The pattern of impacts found with our new modelling 
approach reflects the partially compensating and partially enhancing simultaneous forces of supply 
and demand and spatial substitution effects. At the lower levels of aggregation, for example for the 
import and self-sufficiency shares for the use of natural gas, considerable effects are found. At the 
aggregate level of the whole economy of the regions studied, however, the effects of Russian natural 
gas export bans are negligible for Europe and only a little less so for Russia itself. Interestingly, the 
effects on the size of the economy, as measured by its GDP, are predominantly positive for the 
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European regions, but negative for Russia. The effects on the welfare of the populations involved, 
however, as measured by the size of the domestic final demand, have an opposite sign; with 
predominantly negligible but negative effects for the European regions, and very small positive 
effects for the Russian population. 
 In view of this empirical conclusion, the question arises whether the outcome of negligible 
impacts of various Russian export stops is not overly optimistic and due to the aggregate character of 
the present simulations. This question can be considered from a sectoral aggregation perspective 
and a spatial aggregation perspective. First consider the sectoral aggregation used in this application. 
Having a further disaggregation of sectors that use natural gas intensively might show vulnerabilities 
that now remain undetected. On the other hand, however, separating the electricity production 
based on other energy carriers from the secondary sector and allowing for technical substitution 
between the different types of electricity will introduce more flexibility, and thus mitigate the 
present negative forward effects from electricity on the secondary sector. 
 Next, consider the spatial aggregation. Having a further disaggregation between the different EU 
member states will allow modeling the fragmentation of the EU natural gas market by introducing 
bilateral trade capacity constraints, which reflect the actual natural gas pipeline capacities. The 
model then would not depict the presently assumed full flexibility of the interregional EU natural gas 
trade, which will most certainly lead to several eastern EU-countries being hurt more and maybe 
some northwestern EU-countries being hurt less than is shown in the present simulation outcomes. 
In any case, this new modeling approach appears to be promising and, for the moment, confirms the 
EU expectation that it could well cope with the consequences of a Russian gas boycott. 
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Appendix A: Data aggregation 
Country aggregation 
North-West Europe   North-East Europe  
(5 countries) Denmark  (5 countries) Estonia 
 Ireland   Finland 
 Netherlands   Latvia 
 Norway   Lithuania 
 United Kingdom   Sweden 
     
South-West Europe   Russian Federation  
(9 countries) Belgium  (1 country) Russia 
 France    
 Germany  Rest of the World  
 Italy  (13 countries  Australia 
 Luxembourg  + original RoW region) Brazil 
 Malta   Canada 
 Portugal   China 
 Spain   India 
 Switzerland   Indonesia 
    Japan 
East Europe    Mexico 
(10 countries) Austria   South Africa 
 Bulgaria   South Korea 
 Cyprus   Taiwan 
 Czech Republic   Turkey 
 Greece   United States 
 Hungary   Rest of World  (region) 
 Poland    
 Romania    
 Slovak Republic    




Code Aggregate sector  Aggregate sector # of subsectors 
i01.a – i05 Primary sector  Primary sector 27 
i10 Other energy extraction   Natural gas extraction 1 
i11.a Other energy extraction  Other energy extraction  4 
i11.b Natural gas extraction  Secondary sector 62 
i11.c Other energy extraction  Electricity from gas 1 
i12 Other energy extraction  Tertiary sector 34 
i13.1 – i14.3 Primary sector    
i15.a – i40.11.a Secondary sector    
i40.11.b Electricity from gas    
i40.11.c – i45 Secondary sector    
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